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Abstract 
This text discusses controversies surrounding theoretical, practical, and political 
implications of ‘actor-network theory’ (‘ANT’). Since its inception around 1980, 
‘ANT’ has been applied in an immense number of empirical studies, both within 
and outside the field of science and technology studies. But it was also rejected as 
radical chic without substance and/or as theoretically and politically unacceptable 
in perhaps as many instances as it was accepted. Implicit in both the application 
and critique of ‘ANT’ is the assumption that it can be treated as a ‘black-boxed’ set 
of notions and rules containing certain strengths and weaknesses. Proposing to 
treat black-boxed ‘ANT’ as useful provocation, I discuss what this kind of ‘ANT’ can 
and cannot do for me in my own empirical research on energy efficiency in build-
ings. In the second part of the text I turn from ‘black boxed’ and well-defined ‘ANT’ 
to ‘ANT in the making’. In recent and ongoing work Bruno Latour, John Law, An-
nemarie Mol, Vicky Singleton, and others (in alphabetic order) answer to critiques 
of ‘ANT’s’ political implications.  The authors share an interest in the development 
of a non-essentialist foundation of politics, which neither turns into crude func-
tionalism nor into hollow relativism. Concluding this text, two of the proposals 
made here, ‘political ecology’ and ‘ontological politics’, are compared and discussed 
in the context of my own research. 
                                                             
1 This text would not exist without the constant inspiration and support of my colleagues at 
the Department of Interdisciplinary Cultural Studies in Trondheim. I am deeply grateful for 
the hospitality which I have the privilege to enjoy here. Earlier drafts of this paper were pre-
sented at the 2004 4S conference in Paris and at the 2004 annual meeting of the Gesell-
schaft für Wissenschafts- und Technikforschung in Berlin. The underlying empirical re-
search was funded by the Research Council of Norway and The Norwegian State Housing 
Bank. Finally, I would like to thank the two reviewers for useful corrections and comments 
and Chris Hassenstab for her friendly help with the English. 
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There is life after constructivism – 
constructive STS studies contributing 
to a better society. 
(Bijker 1993, 132) 
Only a Sith deals in absolutes. 
Obi-Wan Kenobi 
1 Choosing the Genre 
One of the founding fathers of ‘actor-
network theory’ (‘ANT’) teaches us that 
it is not by coincidence that academic 
writing usually starts by evoking a ‘well 
established fact’. This fact, if really 
‘well established’, according to Bruno 
Latour (1987), acts as black box, which 
is built on other ‘well-established 
facts’, and so on. The more boxes there 
are stapled onto each other the more 
difficult it becomes for the dissenter to 
disconnect them all and to expose their 
inner workings. And, Latour main-
tains, if there is no dissenter there is 
truth. 
In this text, although I will also de-
scribe how ‘ANT’ is used as a black 
box, I will not naively treat it like one. I 
cannot trust that this box will remain 
sealed. This is partly due to its lack of 
general acceptance, even in my field – 
Science and Technology Studies (STS). 
But this is also very much in line with 
what those who are usually treated as 
proponents of ‘ANT’ say about what 
‘ANT’ is and what it can be. Along with 
them I am equally interested in ‘ANT 
in the making’ as in ‘ANT’ as a tool, 
which can be applied to understand the 
world.  
Through use of one of the more notori-
ous principles from ‘ANT’ I will ob-
serve ‘ANT’s’ “world-building activi-
ties” (Latour 1999b: 21) when and 
where they happen. And there are, of 
course, many more occasions where 
they happen than just when the ac-
credited proponents of ‘ANT’ talk or 
write. I will start with those who per-
form ‘ANT’ and who do so claiming to 
know what it is they are performing. I 
found such accounts of what ‘ANT’ is 
good or bad for in its ‘applications’, 
such as in empirical studies – mostly 
from outside STS – which in fact use 
‘ANT’ as a ‘black box’. But even more 
sure about what ‘ANT’ can do and par-
ticularly about what it cannot do are 
the critics of ‘ANT’. Their descriptions 
are the second source I draw on for 
looking at ‘ANT’ as a properly bounded 
object. All these accounts – be they an-
gry or sympathetic – have one effect: 
they stabilise ‘ANT’ as ANT (without 
single quotes), as a network of people, 
techniques, and material institutions, 
which is able to travel unchanged 
through time and space, also outside 
STS. Only if there is ANT, can it be ap-
plied or criticised. This particular ver-
sion of ‘ANT’ is what I will explore in 
the first part of this text, which will be 
concluded by discussing what it can do 
for me in my research on energy effi-
cient buildings.  
Then, I will turn to those who are criti-
cised and held responsible for ‘ANT’. It 
is a very different ‘ANT’, which we en-
counter here. These are scholars who 
attempt to publicly ‘bury ANT in its 
coffin’ (Latour 1999a), declare ‘ANT’s’ 
adoption to be ‘optional’, and its per-
spective to be ‘multiple’, ‘mobile’, ‘mu-
table’, ‘contingent’, and ‘ambivalent’, to 
quote Vicky Singleton’s answer (1998) 
to the critique (Radder 1998) of one of 
her analyses (1996). Again I will ask 
what this unstable ‘ANT’ can do for 
me, but since I am dealing with ‘ANT 
in the making’ then, this cannot be an 
application or critique from outside 
any longer. Here I accept the invitation 
to partake in the creation of ‘ANT’ and 
will try to find out what it could mean 
to me in my work.  
Part of this trial has already begun. It 
should be clear by now that from the 
very beginning I was using an Actor-
Network perspective on ‘ANT’ itself. I 
invite the reader to see which kind of 
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insights such a perspective can ren-
der.2 
2 Criticising and Applying 
‘ANT’ 
The most prominent example for ‘ANT 
according to its critics’ is probably the 
so-called “epistemological chicken de-
bate”.  
According to the work of Collins and 
Yearley (1992) ‘ANT’ is only ‘seemingly 
radical’. They describe the extended 
symmetry principle3 of the ‘The French 
School’ as requiring great daring, but 
as actually being “essentially conserva-
tive – a poverty of method making it 
subservient to a prosaic view of science 
and technology” (Collins and Yearley 
1992a: 323). In a footnote (note 14 on 
pp. 315-6) they take a couple of quotes 
from Callon’s classic text on the scal-
lops and fishermen of St Brieuc Bay 
(1986) and rephrase them in ‘less radi-
cal’ wording. They state that there is 
nothing new in it but the vocabulary. 
In a later article, which seemingly 
closes the debate (Collins and Yearley 
1992b), they seek a middle ground and 
present themselves as pragmatic 
scholars more interested in changing 
                                                             
2 Unfortunately, due to the approach I have 
chosen here and also to restrictions of 
space I cannot provide a proper introduc-
tion to ‘ANT’. Therefore, I have to assume 
at least some knowledge about ‘ANT’, espe-
cially in the second part of this text. As in-
troduction I usually recommend John 
Law’s easily accessible ‘Notes on the theory 
of the actor-network’ from 1992 
(http://www.lancs.ac.uk/fss/sociology/pap
ers/-law-notes-on-ant.pdf). A slightly out-
dated annotated bibliography of ‘ANT’ can 
be accessed here: http://www.lancs.ac.uk/-
fss/sociology/css/antres/ant.htm (last up-
date 2000) 
3 Latour (1993) extends Bloor’s symmetry 
principle, which states that ‘all beliefs are 
on par with one another with respect to the 
causes of their credibility’ (Barnes and 
Bloor 1982, 69; Bloor 1976) to also com-
prise a symmetric treatment of humans 
and non-humans. 
‘the relationship between science and 
technology and other cultural endeav-
ors’ and understanding ‘what can and 
cannot be delegated to machines’ 
(ibid.: 388). ‘ANT’ – according to them 
– is much more interested in establish-
ing a consistent system, which once es-
tablished would not make a difference 
at all (ibid.: 384). Though more related 
to what Latour or Callon actually write, 
this also alludes to ‘ANT’s’ pied piper-
like attraction, stressing the emptiness 
behind the daring attitude.  
Bruno Latour is often introduced as 
brilliant raconteur, whose style is “ex-
tremely entertaining and creative, but 
it does not always bear close scrutiny 
when rigour is sacrificed for repartee” 
(Scott 1991: 11). In invectives like this, 
the object ‘ANT’ becomes an instru-
ment in the cunning hands of seductive 
Frenchmen, who seduce through 
‘sparkling writing’ (Collins and Yearley 
1992b: 384, note 10) with a ‘French ac-
cent’ (Fuller 2000: 8), promising con-
ceptual unity which – stripped of its 
rhetoric – leads to nothing. The em-
peror has no clothes and nobody, ac-
cording to ‘ANT’s’ critics, is able to see 
that.  
So let’s turn to the seduced. In a quick 
and dirty survey of 18 recent (1998-
2004) applications of ‘ANT’ from out-
side STS, I encountered a limited 
number of reoccurring themes and 
patterns of the use they make of 
‘ANT’.4 The most obvious use of ‘ANT’ 
in these papers concerns the notion of 
networks. Here, we find a tendency to 
focus on social networks so that the 
analyses turn into stories of how an ac-
tor was included in or excluded from a 
social network, and how technologies 
and other non-humans were involved 
in these struggles (e.g., Colwyn Jones 
                                                             
4 This is and cannot be an exhaustive study 
of ‘ANT’s’ reception. I invite the readers to 
compare their own encounters with ‘ANT 
in the wild’, with the observations pre-
sented here. 
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and Dugdale 2002; Davies 2002; Har-
rison and Laberge 2002; Pouloudi et 
al. 2004; Zackariasson and Wilson 
2004). Another, but related storyline I 
encountered in these applications, 
works the other way around. Here 
‘ANT’ is used by technologists dealing 
with technical networks to include 
humans – the users – into their re-
search (e.g., Atkinson 2000; Braa and 
Hedberg 2002; Dunning-Lewis and 
Townson 2004/2005).  
This is, mind you, not to say that they 
apply ‘ANT’ in a wrong way. The argu-
ment is rather that we can ask along 
with Collins and Yearley whether this 
kind of research, which uses ‘ANT’, can 
be rephrased using more traditional 
sociological language without losing 
anything but the radical chic.  
Is, thus, ‘ANT’s’ most important con-
tribution its use of the buzzword ‘net-
work’? Is it really just rhetoric? Not 
every critic rejects ‘ANT’ as a whole. 
Dick Pels, for instance, seeks a middle-
ground between ‘ANT’s’ position and 
other more traditional conceptions. He 
tries to define where ‘ANT’ has gone 
too far, and where exactly it might be 
better not challenge established no-
tions about the world. Pels, thus, as-
cribes the object ‘ANT’ the role of an 
useful agent provocateur, who has to 
step back after “the Great Wall is lev-
elled in order to make room for many 
lesser fences” (ibid.: 296-7). According 
to him it “was the radical demarche 
advocated by Callon and Latour con-
cerning the dualism of Society versus 
Nature”, which opened up room and 
which now can be filled with ‘lesser 
fences’ when we “settle with a weaker 
asymmetry, or a weaker notion about 
the permeable boundary running be-
tween humans and nonhumans.” 
(ibid.: 297)  
Pels’ project is of interest here, because 
it makes explicit another use of ‘ANT’, 
which can be found in applications 
from outside STS. Using ‘ANT’ social 
scientists are allowed to talk about 
technologies and technologists likewise 
become entitled to talk about humans. 
The Great Walls between the social and 
the technical, but also other dualisms, 
such as the one between macro and 
micro, between agency and structure 
are levelled by ‘ANT’ resulting in open-
ings for crossing those boundaries. 
And indeed, turning again to applica-
tions, ‘ANT’s’ anti-essentialist critique 
of dualist thinking is most often men-
tioned. Typically, this is evoked in or-
der to correct a perceived one-
sidedness in the respective field. David 
Featherstone, for instance, studying an 
embargo enforced on shipping on the 
Thames in 1768, uses ‘ANT’s’ rejection 
of the global-local divide to “unsettle a 
tendency to confine subaltern politics 
within bounded spaces and open[s] up 
possibilities for following more dy-
namic trajectories of subaltern political 
activity” (see also Jenkins 2000, 308; 
Featherstone 2004, 702). The struc-
ture-agency dualism is critcised by way 
of ‘ANT’ by Anna Davies (2002, 190) 
and Jaquelin Burgess and her col-
leagues (Burgess et al. 2000, 123) add 
‘nature or society’, expert or lay knowl-
edge’, and ‘science or culture’ as dual-
isms which they plan to overcome by 
means of ‘ANT’. 
The critique of any kind of essentialism 
is of course the very definition of con-
structivist thinking. Also more specifi-
cally ‘essentialist dualisms’ have been 
criticised at length within other theo-
retical approaches. For the ‘science or 
culture’ chasm one could refer to al-
most all of STS theory including 
Collins and Yearley. For rethinking the 
‘expert or lay knowledge’ dichotomy 
Bloor’s (1976) symmetry principle 
works well enough. The ‘agency or 
structure’ problem can be solved for 
instance with the conventional sociol-
ogy of Giddens’ structuration theory, 
and the literature trying to overcome 
the global-local divide is abundant.  
So, what explains ‘ANT’s’ appeal to be 
used against dualist notions? I propose 
that it is its promise to get rid of all of 
them – at once – while providing a tool 
which can be applied pragmatically 
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and intuitively. Particularly ‘ANT’s’ 
network metaphor guarantees its ap-
plicability, making it an anti-dualist 
‘Swiss Knife’ useful as agent provo-
cateur in a broad variety of settings – 
from ‘wet-land agri-environment 
schemes’ (Burgess et al. 2000), ‘inter-
networked after-sales service’ 
(Zackariasson and Wilson 2004), 
‘computerized medical record systems’ 
(Lehoux et al. 1999), ‘Australia’s coun-
try towns (Herbert-Cheshire 2003) to 
‘meat consumption and meat produc-
tion in the U.S.’ (Gouveia and Juska 
2002), and ‘reflex anal dilatation’ 
(Collins et al. 1998).  
For now we can conclude that ‘ANT’ – 
when used as black box – provides 
handy tools, which help to criticize du-
alistic thinking. But where does that 
lead? Exactly what type of descriptions 
of the world are we capable of making 
with this kind of black-boxed ‘ANT’?  
3 Making Buildings More En-
ergy Eefficient – Black 
Boxed ‘ANT’ in Action 
At this point I leave applications and 
critiques by others and turn to my own 
research. I have a particular problem 
in my work and I want to know what 
the anti-dualistic ‘ANT’ can do to help 
me. 
Since 2002 I have worked in an inter-
disciplinary research project aiming at 
improving energy consumption in of-
fice buildings. The research group con-
sists of architects, engineers and STS 
scholars, all in all some 30 researchers 
of which a majority has already worked 
as consultants. The starting point of 
this project was the recognition that 
energy consumption for basic services 
in buildings is high and still increasing, 
despite the fact that there exists tech-
nology which could contribute to dra-
matic savings. There is hardly any rea-
son not to implement these technolo-
gies, given considerable cost-savings, 
political considerations and overall en-
vironmental benefits of decreased en-
ergy usage.  
One main focus of the project is to im-
prove technologies like solar cells, CO2 
heat pumps, insulation, energy storage, 
and better use of daylight through bet-
ter building envelopes. Additional to 
the research on individual technolo-
gies, the project deals with missing in-
tegration, missing user acceptance, 
and lack of implementation strategies. 
As a STS researcher I am responsible 
for two work packages, one about users 
and one about implementation. 
Though the bulk of work is confined 
within the individual work packages, 
which are organised along disciplinary 
boundaries, there are regular common 
activities like workshops and presenta-
tions. I made it a point to attend as 
many as possible of these and visited 
13 of my colleagues in their offices in-
terviewing them about what they 
thought what the actual problem was. 
At these occasions it soon became clear 
that there are at least two very differ-
ent types of experts (see also Berker 
2005).  
On the one hand there are those who 
were principally open to a broad inclu-
sion of every other relevant group. One 
of the actual techniques promoted in 
this group is called ‘integrated design 
process’ (Larsson w/o year), which 
calls for a more thorough planning 
with the inclusion of several different 
groups in an early phase of the build-
ing project. Technology is involved in 
this as a tool for collaboration as well 
as through a couple of normative no-
tions about how a more energy effi-
cient building should look like, when it 
is designed in an integrated way. Par-
ticularly the building envelope and the 
physical location of the building is 
relevant here, both in terms of energy 
consumption and in that it is a vari-
able, which is difficult to change at a 
later date. According to my colleagues, 
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‘integrated design processes’ can lead 
to buildings that hardly need any heavy 
HVAC5 installations. Ventilation and 
cooling is taken care of by an intelli-
gent setup of the building from the 
very beginning. One underlying set of 
values evoked in this group concerns 
‘natural’ ways of building. This means 
above all that fewer technologies 
should be involved. Examples for these 
‘natural’ technologies are ‘natural’ ven-
tilation6 utilising natural draught and 
the more efficient use of daylight.  
The other group is much more hesitant 
when it comes to including other 
groups into the design process. In a set 
of techniques bundled under the label 
‘continuous commissioning’ they hope 
to improve building automation using 
computerised real time surveillance of 
every single parameter which is rele-
vant to energy consumption and com-
fort in the building. These systems are 
‘intelligent’ in that they learn from the 
occupants and adapt the parameters, 
continuously guarding the optimal 
state of the whole system. Manuals de-
scribing the process (e.g. FEMP 2002), 
recommend some limited inclusion of 
local technicians, but the actual ‘con-
tinuous commissioning’ is done by a 
specially trained engineer. Technologi-
cal choices following from this, favour 
HVAC systems which are as reactive to 
new target parameters as possible, so 
that the theoretical optimum is 
reached quickly. The notion of ‘natural’ 
as it is present in the first group, is 
missing completely here.  
A lot of discussion between both fac-
tions circles around the question of 
how much technology is necessary in 
order to reach a ‘good’, i.e. comfort-
                                                             
5 HVAC=Heating, ventilation, air condi-
tioning 
6 Natural ventilation is hardly ever ’natural’ 
in the sense that it does not involve me-
chanical ventilation; the correct term would 
be ‘hybrid’ ventilation, but ‘natural’ is used 
equally often. 
able, functional and energy efficient 
building. The rift between two groups, 
I was told, is common in the building 
sector and can be held responsible for 
poor integration between technical in-
stallations and the rest of the building, 
which should be aligned in order to 
provide for optimal energy efficiency. 
The usual way of dealing with different 
goals is strict division of labour, and to 
a certain extent this was also what 
happened within our project. When the 
project, after three years, entered its 
final phase this current year, the pro-
ject leader decided that money should 
be provided as extra incentive for in-
terdisciplinary work, which lead to 
pragmatic collaborations for instance 
around how ‘continuous commission-
ing’ and ‘integrated design’ could com-
plement each other.  
To conclude the description of my par-
ticipant observations: Technologies 
and techniques which could help to 
save energy do not travel well from the 
laboratories to a building’s everyday 
life. Additionally there are two visions 
of how these technologies and tech-
niques are to be implemented in real 
life buildings and building projects. 
Thus, we have two different visions of 
energy efficient office buildings.  
So, what can ‘ANT’ do for us in this 
situation? According to the key tenets 
of ‘ANT’, the two visions present in the 
project are political in that they reflect 
an attitude of relating the environ-
ment, technologies, experts, janitors, 
building owners and occupants to each 
other. More specifically described in 
the jargon of ‘ANT’: these visions each 
consist of notions of how the ‘actants’7 
present in the building (and also: being 
the building) should be ‘translated’. 
Put this way, the antagonism between 
                                                             
7 ‘Actants’ are humans and non-humans 
provided with their agency by the relations 
in which they exist. This term was intro-
duced to replace the notion of ‘actor’ which 
is usually imagined to be human. 
Berker, The Politics of ‘Actor-Network Theory’ 67 
 
the two groups within the project (and 
presumably also beyond it) cannot be 
about ‘nature’ versus ‘technology’. The 
second group ‘enrolls’8 CO2, how 
quickly it heats up and how long it 
stores energy; the first group tries to 
capture draught’s cooling powers. No 
difference here in the eye of ‘ANT’, but 
different strategies whose outcome will 
depend on whether the ‘enrolment’ of a 
sufficient number of human and non-
human entities will succeed or not. 
And this is actually the way my col-
leagues deal with the conflict as well. 
In those interdisciplinary groups, 
which were installed recently, prag-
matic negotiations take place about 
which human and non-human entities 
‘enrolled’ by one group can be useful 
for the other.  
In ‘ANT’s’ terms the goal of establish-
ing new and more energy efficient 
technologies and practices is the same 
as establishing new irreversible trans-
lations of as many heterogeneous ‘ac-
tants’ as possible (building owners and 
CO2 and draught and end users and 
janitors, etc). Here lies one contribu-
tion of ‘ANT’, to remind the engineers 
and architects of what they are doing 
anyway i.e. relating a broad set of 
things and people to each other. And 
this is also the first use of ‘ANT’, which 
was presented above as strategy found 
in applications from outside STS. If we 
refuse a priori distinctions like the one 
between nature and technology, social 
science is no longer forced to impose 
categories onto the practice of the ac-
tors. This is, in the situation given 
here, particularly useful for taking part 
in the project’s everyday work. Since 
there is nothing wrong with more en-
ergy efficient buildings – quite the op-
posite – together we now can build a 
brighter future.  
                                                             
8 In ‘ANT’s’ jargon this word is used to de-
scribe a crucial stage when a new ‘actant’ is 
included into a network (see Callon 1986). 
But are we not loosing something 
here? Is this not a ‘poor method’ which 
looses any specificity from a social sci-
ence approach? Are we not giving up 
valuable distinctions, such as for ex-
ample nature and technology? Where 
is the critical edge?  
In fact, maybe there is actually not 
much to be said at all without taking at 
least some dualisms for granted. La-
tour’s writings are full of modest ges-
tures pointing into this direction:  
“ANT does not tell anyone the shape 
that is to be drawn – circles or cubes 
or lines – but only how to go about 
systematically recording the world-
building activities of the sites to be 
documented and registered” (Latour 
1999b: 21).  
This conceptual modesty suits the the-
ory very well, which, first and fore-
most, promises to follow the actors, 
but it is also one of the most criticised 
aspects of ‘ANT’. Here, my doubts are 
shared by critics of ‘ANT’ to which I 
will now turn again, preparing the 
ground for the second part of this text:  
Steve Fuller identifies ‘ANT’s’ modesty 
with “the Mode 2 conception of policy-
driven ‘postdisciplinary’ research, 
which welcomes the university’s per-
meability to extramural concerns.” 
(Fuller 2000: 9) He is not exactly fond 
of Mode 2, which, according to him, 
serves ‘more centrally located clients’ 
and delivers ‘on a platter those on the 
social periphery’ (ibid.). He says:  
“Under such a regime [of Mode 2 
contract research], if researchers do 
not provide quality information 
about their subjects to clients, they 
will be quickly replaced by someone 
more willing and able to do so.” 
(ibid.: 11)  
The argument that ‘ANT’, with its dis-
regard for ‘broader patterns’, always 
has to take ‘the winners point of view’ 
(Radder 1992: 161) has two aspects. 
First, it is part of a larger group of po-
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litical objections, which are only then 
valid if shared political goals can be as-
sumed, e.g. not to betray ‘those on the 
social periphery’, not to take ‘the win-
ners point of view’, and instead to take 
an openly “evaluative stance towards 
social consequences of technology” 
(Winner 1993: 368), for instance 
against the “militarization of science 
and technology, especially in this cen-
tury” (Radder 1992: 151;  see also Win-
ner 1993: 370-1). Second, it accuses 
‘ANT’ to impose restrictions on the re-
searcher, which render the research 
irrelevant, because s/he can only know 
what the actors know, and has no pre-
sumptive categories which could help 
to see the researched in a new light. 
Turning to ‘ANT’ and how it is per-
formed in its applications also sup-
ports this kind of critique. The major-
ity of the texts that were presented 
above have ‘management’, ‘planning’ 
or ‘organisation’ in its title or in the 
name of the journal where they were 
published. I have insisted on the pro-
ductive aspect of these efforts to make 
management of humans and non-
humans more effective, which I found 
in the deconstruction of dualisms. 
However, this does not help in the 
situation in which I find myself in the 
Smartbuild project. Ironically, the only 
dualism I can think of here, which may 
be worth deconstructing, is the one be-
tween the technical and the social. It 
can be said that particularly in ‘con-
tinuous commissioning’ there are fan-
tasies of managing people through 
‘smart’ technology and only through 
technology. The humans within the 
building then become reduced to being 
a problem, dubious delegates, who 
should be controlled by ‘smart tech-
nology’. To reveal this one-sidedness is 
a line of reasoning I have used before 
(Berker 2005). Overall, however, we 
have to accept that the heterogeneity of 
energy efficiency in buildings is suffi-
ciently acknowledged in the work of 
my colleagues. The relative strong 
presence of social scientists (including 
myself) shows that besides the tech-
nology there is a genuine interest in 
non-technical aspects. This hardly 
comes as a surprise, since ‘ANT’ has 
taught us that successful engineering is 
always about managing both humans 
and non-humans. And finally, as a re-
searcher who works at a STS depart-
ment with the name ‘Center for Tech-
nology and Society’, I am hardly cross-
ing disciplinary boundaries, when I do 
research on technology and society. 
The anti-dualistic vigour of ‘ANT’, 
thus, cannot contribute much for me in 
the Smartbuild project. 
Is helping to organise, to plan, to man-
age energy efficiency more efficiently 
through engineering the only thing we 
can learn from ‘ANT’? And if so, what 
do I have to contribute which is differ-
ent from the knowledge how to engage 
as many humans and non-humans as 
possible to support the diffusion of my 
colleagues’ favourite technologies? Do 
I find the black box empty after others 
have opened it before? Where is my 
own vision between or beyond the vi-
sion of architects and engineers? This 
is the problem I am facing and it seems 
that black boxed ‘ANT’ does not lead 
me closer to a solution. 
4 ‘ANT’ as Critique 
Judging from their reactions to this 
kind of critique – maybe from the fact 
that they react at all – we can assume 
that those who are criticised – Latour, 
Callon, Law, and other scholars held 
responsible for ‘ANT’ – are not content 
with this version of black-boxed ‘ANT’. 
In the second part of the text I turn to 
recent (and not so recent) develop-
ments of ‘ANT’, which answers the cri-
tiques presented in the first part. ‘ANT’ 
is shifting here; it becomes less clear 
what it actually is and when it is re-
vised it is also becoming polyphonic. I 
will focus on two of these versions of 
‘ANT in the making’, and try to make 
clear where they are different, and 
where they agree. 
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4.1 Political Ecology According to 
Due Process 
First there is Bruno Latour’s project of 
a political ecology (Latour 2004). 
When things and animals and humans 
all have the same ontological status 
then two directions are possible. First, 
humans are treated like things, which 
is the negation of any politics. Or sec-
ondly, human rights could also be ex-
tended to non-humans. The latter op-
tion is exactly what Latour’s political 
ecology does, extending of the liberal 
right of representation to everyone and 
everything (Lee and Brown 1994: 788).  
According to Latour we already live in 
the age of political ecology: 
“Not many years ago, when we were 
contemplating the sky above our 
heads, we thought of nothing but 
matter and nature. Nowadays, when 
we look above our heads, we watch a 
sociopolitical imbroglio, because, for 
instance, the depletion of the ozone 
layer brings together a scientific con-
troversy, a political dispute between 
North and South, and gigantic stra-
tegic moves inside industry.” (Latour 
1994: 796) 
For Latour the task is now to deal with 
these socio-political imbroglios with-
out taking shortcuts following outdated 
divisions between the social and the 
natural, values and facts, and of course 
humans and non-humans. Latour 
(2004) describes a new parliamentary 
order in which those representing na-
ture and arte/facts (scientists) and 
those representing humans and values 
(politicians) work closely together. To-
gether with other groups like econo-
mists, diplomats, and also sociologists 
they have different tasks in this com-
mon enterprise, whose goal is to in-
clude facts and artefacts in an open 
way into the ‘collective’9. This basically 
                                                             
9 Latour defines the ’collective’ as the proc-
ess in which associations between humans 
 
means to assign them a place, mean-
ing, and value after an evaluation done 
in consultations by the members of the 
collective. Latour insists that all this 
has to be done according to ‘due proc-
ess’10. This is what distinguishes his vi-
sion from the status quo, and could 
therefore also be called his political 
message: Neither politicians, nor sci-
entists, nor economists, nor any other 
group should be allowed to make deci-
sions on their own as to which fact or 
artefact will have which place, mean-
ing, and value in the world we share. 
All these different groups become in-
volved in a process, which he calls the 
‘collective’.  
Is this the answer I was looking for? In 
Latour’s political ecology, new and 
more energy efficient technologies 
would have to go through the same 
‘due process’ as any other object. Ac-
cording to Latour, there are constantly 
new challenges to the ‘collective’. 
Those challenges in my example would 
be the threat of climate change as well 
as the general depletion of natural re-
sources. All of this is closely related to 
energy consumption among others in 
buildings. The question now is what 
this means for the ‘collective’ or 
whether it should meaningful at all. 
There are many different versions of 
what to do and all of them ground in a 
particular understanding of what is ‘ac-
tually’ happening. Within the Smart-
build project we have seen two differ-
ent proposals, but there are of course, 
many more. Latour calls this stage the 
stage of ‘perplexity’. ‘Due process’, 
now, is the method with which the 
‘perplexed’ collective ‘in due course’ 
finds ways to deal with them, discuss-
ing options, risks, and value hierar-
chies, and finally building institutions 
                                                                          
and non-humans, facts and artefacts are 
collected (cf. Latour 2004: 238). 
10 This term is borrowed from the Anglo-
Saxon judicial tradition (cf. Hyman 2005 
for an introduction). 
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fixing what it means to live together 
with climate threat and no oil left. A 
process is legitimate, according to La-
tour, when it does not leapfrog over 
important steps, like the one he calls 
‘consultation’, where relevant other 
‘actants’ are heard,  and ‘hierarchy’, 
where the new ‘actants’ are ordered ac-
cording to their value for the collective.  
In the light of Latour’s ‘due process’, 
the Smartbuild project’s task cannot be 
to foster the new objects from the cra-
dle to the grave. It would be exactly 
what Latour describes as ‘undue’ proc-
ess if the group of scientists gathered 
and, provided with laboratories and 
other more or less powerful tools, 
would seek shortcuts excluding other 
relevant entities like existing buildings 
and their installations, other routes to 
energy efficiency developed at other 
places, janitors, end-users and so forth. 
These have to be included and alto-
gether the collective will decide which 
of the new objects proposed by the en-
gineers, social scientists and architects 
of the Smartbuild project will finally be 
implemented. This is ‘ANT’ turned po-
litically democratising the business of 
‘heterogeneous engineering’ (Law 
1986).  
Thus, the members of the Smartbuild 
project are once again reminded that 
they are dealing with a broad set of en-
tities, and so far there is nothing new 
in this. The good news however, is that 
now they are not alone, that they are 
relieved from the duty to do all the 
things that they are not trained to do. 
Instead they are supposed to do what 
they are good in, using their instru-
ments to continuously displace and 
change their point of view (Latour 
2004: 138) in order to see and record 
those new things and relations, which 
the rest of the collective is not able to 
see. Scientists, maintains Latour, have 
the power to discover new entities be-
fore they are well-defined members of 
the collective. Their task is to be the 
spokespersons for these entities and to 
present them to the collective, which 
then through consultations has to 
come to grips with how to proceed. In 
this model a social scientist’s task is 
not to know what, for example, energy 
efficiency is or should be in lieu of the 
actors,  
“[b]ut to inquire into what binds us, 
we can count on the human sciences’ 
offering the actors multiple and rap-
idly revised versions that allow us to 
understand the collective experience 
in which we are all engaged.” (Latour 
2004: 225-226) 
In this sense, besides producing these 
‘rapidly revised’ versions, which will 
help ‘us’ to understand how ‘we’ can 
build and live more energy efficiently, 
it could also be my task in the Smart-
build project to remind my colleagues 
not to give in to expectations which 
drive them to build the houses which 
they are now envisioning closing the 
debate all too early.  
4.2 From Warm and Light Re-
versibility to the Margins 
The journey is not yet at an end, 
though. We have seen that Bruno La-
tour, in line with his model of a politi-
cal ecology, invites us to revise his 
proposition. Drawing on other versions 
of ‘ANT’s’ political project, proposed by 
Bruno Latour, Michel Callon, John 
Law, Vicky Singleton, Annemarie Mol, 
and others (in order of appearance), I 
will use the reminder of this text to do 
exactly that.  
The common starting point for these 
alternative propositions is a different 
understanding of the relation between 
reversibility and irreversibility of 
translations and, thus, about stability 
of associations and their change. Half 
of the ‘due process’, which Latour is 
advocating, is about destabilisation of 
established associations in the stages 
of ‘perplexity’ and ‘consultation’ and 
thus about destabilisation of the collec-
tive itself. But the other half is about 
re-ordering and stabilising the collec-
tive and the appealing entity, which in 
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‘ANT’s’ relational logic is one and the 
same thing.  
The question of how change and stabil-
ity come about is already an important 
topic in the early life of the object 
‘ANT’. In 1981 Michel Callon and 
Bruno Latour place themselves (the 
sociologist, that is): 
“ […] in the warm, light places where 
black boxes open up, where the irre-
versible is reversed and techniques 
return to life; the places that give 
birth to uncertainty as to what is 
large and what is small, what is social 
and what technical.” (Callon and La-
tour 1981: 301) 
This is the foundation of ‘ANT’s’ anti-
dualistic perspective: when entities are 
not yet fixed, nothing can be taken for 
granted about their essence, and those 
who are dealing with them, heteroge-
neous engineers, but also sociologists 
and others, make a mistake when they 
treat them as if they were already sta-
bilised as nature or as technology or as 
social, and so forth. A text by Callon – 
published ten years later – moves this 
description of the theorist’s place over 
to a distinction between different types 
of networks distinguished by the de-
gree of their reversibility. He states 
that some networks contain more of 
these ‘warm and light’ places than oth-
ers, while some networks are more 
stable than others: 
“[…] the more numerous and hetero-
geneous the interrelationships the 
greater the degree of network co-
ordination and the greater the prob-
ability of successful resistance to al-
ternative translations.” (Callon 1991: 
150) 
This kind of irreversibility, according 
to Callon, is always accompanied by 
standardisation and normalisation of 
interfaces which enable the heteroge-
neous associations to resist alternative 
translations (Callon 1991: 151). There 
are highly standardised networks in 
which a great number of heterogene-
ous actors are completely and thor-
oughly acted by the network. Not much 
to see for ‘ANT’ scholars here but a lot 
of tightly locked deep black boxes and 
powerful ‘immutable mobiles’ which 
enable ‘action at a distance’ from pow-
erful ‘centres of calculation’. But Callon 
(1991: 152) maintains that there are 
also networks where translations are 
constantly done and undone. These 
networks are characterised by “strat-
egy, the negotiation and variation of 
aims, revisable projects, and changing 
coalitions.” (Callon 1991, 154).  
This is the background for Susan Leigh 
Star (1991) when she criticises ‘ANT’s’ 
politics in a text published in the same 
collection. She argues that irreversibil-
ity is never reached for every node of a 
network, that “[s]tabilized networks 
seem to insist on annihilating our per-
sonal experience, and there is suffer-
ing.” (Star 1991: 48) In this quote Star, 
who is representing symbolic interac-
tionism in STS (cf. Clarke and Star 
2003 for an overview), reintroduces 
the human subject through the con-
tainer of personal suffering. The quote, 
however, also contains a notion, which 
can be turned critically against ‘ANT‘ 
without leaving its premises. If no net-
work is ever stabilised for every ‘ac-
tant’, then there are always groups of 
entities at the ‘margins’11, which then 
have to deal with the black boxes, 
which were closed in ways that do not 
allow them to become ‘proper’ entity.  
The political question now is, how 
‘ANT’ deals with these unstable regions 
within stable networks. The process 
which Latour calls the ‘collective’ is 
kept moving by exactly the tension be-
tween those already included into the 
collective and those outside, which are 
‘appealing’ to the ‘collective’. ‘Due 
process’ means that there is a time in 
                                                             
11 For more background on Star’s critique 
see also her work on boundary objects, 
which per definitionem are marginal (Star 
and Griesemer 1989).  
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the early life of a new member (’ac-
tant’) of the collective, where it is not 
yet fixed. But later on there is also a 
time – the time of ‘consultation’ – 
where the ‘actant’ becomes translated 
into something more fixed and then, 
after it has been placed in a ‘hierarchy’ 
is embedded in an irreversible way 
(‘institutionalised’). ‘Due process’ 
means exactly that no shortcut is taken 
from reversibility to irreversibility (or 
vice versa), that the transition between 
these two states takes place in an open 
and politically legitimate way. 
Here Star’s objection is valid. What 
about those members of the collective 
that are neither outside the process 
called the ‘collective’, nor inside, but 
systematically and continually stuck 
between reversible and irreversible 
translations? In other words: what 
about the places, where associations 
neither yet exist nor are successfully 
stabilized, which are not beginning, 
but not ending either? 
4.3 On being Allergic to ‘Con-
tinuous Commissioning’ and 
‘Integrated Design’ 
Susan Leigh Star uses her own allergy 
to onions as an example. This con-
stantly causes trouble for her since she 
is forced to live in networks which are 
stabilised around not being allergic to 
onions. We can now ask who and what 
is excluded by the visions of my col-
leagues. Who and what would be inc-
ommensurable to the versions of net-
works they suggest? 
Both engineering visions, which were 
presented above, are equally about 
‘human/nonhuman mingling’, but 
there are conspicuous absences of cer-
tain humans and non-humans.  
‘Continuous commissioning’ does pro-
duce a lot of data from sensors all over 
the building. To analyse this data and 
to draw the right conclusions, special 
expert knowledge is necessary, which 
my colleagues have, but no one else 
has. Particularly absent is local knowl-
edge owned by building managers and 
occupants and which usually is difficult 
to access by external experts. In ‘con-
tinuous commissioning’ this is re-
placed by data, which is suitable for 
advanced methods of calculation.  
The architects’ idea to focus on thor-
ough planning in early stages of the 
process (‘integraded design’) excludes 
systematically all those groups, whose 
possible contribution is based on daily 
experience within the building, again 
mainly maintenance personnel and oc-
cupants. This is firstly because early in 
the building process it is not yet clear 
who exactly will move in. But there is 
also a more fundamental problem hav-
ing to do with the different character of 
knowledge needed early in the process. 
For instance, the literature in partici-
pative design (e.g. Kensing and 
Madsen 1991; Greenbaum 1993) notes 
that it is difficult for lay people to read 
and understand abstract representa-
tions, such as construction drawings, 
without special training. And the more 
decisions which are taken early on, the 
more the building will be the domain 
of experts and less controlled by those 
living and working in the building at a 
later date.  
All this is perfectly ‘normal’ in terms of 
‘ANT’s’ description of how translations 
are stabilised. Both visions of energy 
efficient buildings allow experts who 
reside in ‘centres of calculation’ to con-
trol basic parameters of the building, a 
control which was before in the hands 
of locals such as for example janitors 
or the occupants.  
That this can be a source of tension 
and conflict became particularly clear 
when ‘continuous commissioning’ was 
presented at a workshop earlier this 
year, where a large group of facilities 
managers and janitors were present. It 
was obvious that they felt threatened, 
because their expertise of working with 
today’s HVAC systems would be ren-
dered worthless when these new sys-
tems were introduced. When they un-
derstood that ‘continuous commission-
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ing’ is not yet ready for broad imple-
mentation their reaction was a mixture 
of relief and malice. This kind of pas-
sive resistance is, in fact, something 
architects and engineers complain 
about a lot. Those janitors in the ac-
counts of experts become an inert mass 
which is resistant to any change.  
The solution, according to Latour’s po-
litical ecology, is to engage them, to 
make them the local associations, 
which are needed to build the larger 
ones. If that does not succeed, then ei-
ther they or the ‘continuous commis-
sioning’ and ‘integrated design process’ 
have to leave the ‘collective’.  
But with Star we can now ask, what 
about those janitors, who live on in the 
niches and gaps that exist between the 
newly established facts and artifacts, 
after ‘continuous commissioning ex-
perts’ have replaced their function? 
Even though they may be too old to 
learn the new routines they do not just 
disappear. Or, if ‘continuous commis-
sioning’ and ‘integrated design’ are 
successfully obstructed by the resistant 
locals: what about innovations which 
never fully succeed, but which do not 
vanish either? More generally (and 
more solemnly): what about those who 
hardly survive at the margins, those 
who suffer from mysterious diseases 
which do not appear in treatment 
schemes and never will, those who 
would love to be proper members of 
the ‘collective’ (even as a patient in one 
of its institutions) if they only could 
manage to fit in? Political ecology à la 
Latour only knows of them that they 
are ‘failed’ objects, which are encour-
aged to try again: “It is sad, but in ‘due 
process’ it was decided that energy ef-
ficiency is a greater good than your ex-
pertise, you see?” 
Those failed objects may vanish from 
the collective’s (bad) conscious but 
they do not stop to exist and ‘there is 
suffering’, which is ‘othered’ in political 
ecology once more. Political ecology in 
its desire to pacify inclusion and exclu-
sion – to say it mildly – does not un-
derstand these objects at the margins 
very well. 
4.4 New Objects: Fires and Fluids 
This critique of ‘ANT’s’ difficulties with 
the Other is not new, its most poignant 
version perhaps being Lee and Brown’s 
lucid analysis of ‘ANT’s’ inner work-
ings from 1994. I tried to argue in the 
previous sections that political ecol-
ogy’s inclusion and exclusion in ‘due 
process’ cannot be a satisfactory an-
swer.  
But there are other answers. Referring 
explicitly to Star’s argument, John Law 
(2000) suggests that early ‘ANT’ fol-
lowed its research objects, ‘heteroge-
neous engineers’, too closely, so that 
those excluded by these system build-
ers would become excluded one more 
time in the description made by the so-
cial scientist. He concludes that ‘ANT’ 
indeed was too much interested in 
functional networks, which then only 
can be analysed as a success or a fail-
ure.  
The question he asks then is whether 
this kind of crude functionalism is a 
necessary result of abandoning funda-
mental categories like nature, society, 
and so forth. His answer is “no”. He 
finds visions of a “non-foundational 
but material relationality that is not 
functionalist” in Donna Haraway’s 
work (1988; 1991b; 1997), and also in 
Annemarie Mol’s description of multi-
ple bodies (Mol 2002). This has since 
become the starting point for a quest to 
find a way to describe other kinds of 
objects, which – according to ‘ANT’s’ 
relational materiality – also means to 
describe other kinds of associations.  
In terms of reversibility/irreversibility, 
the task is to find a way to understand 
translations which are reversible, but 
which are irreversibly so, constituting 
objects which are neither stabilised, 
nor fractioned into an arbitrary multi-
plicity. John Law and Vicky Singleton 
(2005) call two of these object types 
‘fluid objects’ and ‘fire objects’, leaving 
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open the question if there are more 
types. They are best described by ex-
ample. There is first a ‘fluid’ technol-
ogy, as exemplified by the Zimbabwean 
bush pump, which was analysed in 
depth by Marianne De Laet and An-
nemarie Mol (2000). The pump was 
designed by an engineer, but he has 
written its adaptation to its surround-
ings into the apparatus. Its parts are 
easily replaceable and can be patched 
with other unforeseen parts. Addition-
ally, the pump is designed in a way so 
that the respective local community is 
actively involved in every implementa-
tion and in maintaining the pump. The 
engineer stays actively involved in the 
development and includes improve-
ments he observes. In ‘ANT’s’ terms 
this pump is not an ‘immutable mobile’ 
but still traveling while adapting its 
shape to the surrounding. This is its 
fluidity, which gives it a certain degree 
of multiplicity, but not in a way 
whereby it looses its shape completely. 
It is not one but neither many.12 
The other kind of objects, called fire 
objects, also travels. But it does so in 
unpredictable, disruptive, discontinu-
ous ways. The example for such an ob-
ject, which is used by Law and Single-
ton (2005) is alcoholic liver disease, 
which they found to be defined by a 
couple of ‘generative absences’. They 
found that alcoholic liver diseases in 
practice are constituted by absent al-
ternatives imagined by the practitio-
ners (e.g. abstinence or hard drug 
abuse, etc). Another generative ab-
sence is that the therapy depends on 
absent conditions outside the reach of 
those who want to help, for instance, a 
satisfying social life or work. And fi-
nally there is the absence of alcohol it-
                                                             
12 ‘Fluid objects’ share this feature with 
‘boundary objects’ (cf. Star and Griesemer 
1989). The focus, however, is not on how 
these entities relate social worlds to each 
other, but on how their fluidity allows them 
to travel through ever-changing associa-
tions. 
self, which is generative in practices 
surrounding this disease. All this 
makes alcoholic liver disease a ‘messy’ 
object (Law 2004), which is difficult to 
study and understand, because not 
only the practitioner but also the re-
searcher deals with absences s/he can-
not know about, but which are consti-
tutive nevertheless.  
The difference between fluid and fire 
objects is that fluidity presupposes that 
the absent Other is smoothly included 
in a controlled way (the engineer is still 
there somewhere), whereas in the case 
of the fire object the Other is taking 
control over the object in an unpre-
dictable way.  
Turning to my project for the last time, 
energy efficiency can be described as 
fire object, because it is generated by 
the absence of energy consumption. 
Therefore, efficient practices ‘in the 
wild’ appear unpredictably here and 
there. Both versions of energy effi-
ciency, which were presented above, 
exclude the locals and their specific 
knowledge trying to replace them by 
technical and organisational means.  
According to them, the same technol-
ogy, the same strategy should be ap-
plied in every building.  
However, the uses of energy are maybe 
too multiple, too uncertain, too open-
ended, to be thoroughly controlled 
from afar. We may therefore ask if flu-
idity would be a ‘better’ way of pursu-
ing energy efficiency? In terms of cal-
culable efficiency the answer is proba-
bly “no”. A perfectly aligned network of 
all relevant ‘actants’ will in fact be en-
ergy efficient. Then, energy efficiency 
is turned into a proper object and other 
entities, such as for instance the local 
janitor and his/her knowledge are ex-
cluded from the associations which 
constitute the building. Those low-
energy or even zero-energy buildings, 
which already exist today, in which 
everything revolves around energy effi-
ciency demonstrate exactly this: that 
cases where energy efficiency is align-
ing the building’s contingencies and 
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multiplicities are – energy efficient. In 
real world buildings this is not the case 
and therefore a more fluid approach 
may have its virtues, dealing better 
with the fire object energy efficiency, 
which slips through the fingers of 
those, who wish to make it a constant, 
definite, and unambiguous entity. 
5 A World of Bastards? 
In the ontology of Latour’s political 
ecology, failed objects are expelled dur-
ing the course of the ‘due process’. Dis-
tinguishing between different kinds of 
‘failed’ entities and elevating them to 
the state of ‘proper’ objects with de-
fined traits – such as fire objects and 
fluid objects – we postpone their evic-
tion.  
Fire objects, despite the difficulties one 
encounters trying to account for some-
thing which is defined by an absence, 
do not have to be a bad thing. Near the 
fire, where bastards of reversibility and 
irreversibility thrive, there may also be 
‘warm and bright’ places still to dis-
cover. Fluid and fire objects may be 
special cases, which call for special at-
tention. John Law, however, argues 
through reference to his own and to 
Annemarie Mol’s (2002) research, that 
the inconstancy, multiplicity, and in-
definiteness (Law 2004: 145) of the 
Other can be found everywhere in real-
life practices, which are, therefore, in 
principle ‘messy’. According to him 
this ‘messiness’ a by-product of Euro-
American metaphysics, which defines 
‘proper’ objects as definite, constant, 
singular, or in other words tries to 
convert the bastards to legitimate chil-
dren and does exclude those who won’t 
fit into the picture. This leads him to 
call for new methods of scientific work 
that are able to deal better with this 
kind of Otherness without trying to ex-
tinguish it from both method and the 
real world.  
To account non-inclusively, non-
exclusively, and non-instrumentally for 
the often surprisingly robust bastards 
of the reversible and the irreversible 
gives us access to a whole new world of 
objects, which were invisible before. 
When we are looking for them, we 
suddenly encounter a host of bastards, 
such as ad hoc improvisations, which 
sometimes last longer than any care-
fully crafted ‘immutable mobile’ (and 
nobody fully understands why) or 
‘zombie objects’ which should be dead 
but do live on, because they are just too 
monstrous to die.  
Whether we want a world ruled by 
definiteness, constancy, singularity or 
– on the contrary – a world, which is 
filled by indefinite, multiple, ever-
shifting bastards, all this becomes a 
question of ‘ontological politics’ in the 
end. This is Annemarie Mol’s (1999) 
term describing the relation between 
ontology and politics, which becomes a 
relation of mutual constitution if con-
structivist non-essentialism is taken 
seriously. John Law calls a politics 
which aims at definiteness, constancy 
and singularity a “class politics of on-
tology which is bad” and continues to 
say that “[g]reater permeability and 
recognition of fluidity and all the rest, 
overall this cannot be a bad” (Law 
2004: 149). 
Can it be a bad thing? To be sure, there 
is a whole host of fears which is be fu-
elled by fluidity13. Put more generally, 
the endless struggles for stable na-
tional, group and individual identity in 
modernity have all their indefinite, 
multiple, dissolving Other, be it ‘eter-
nal Jews’, overflows of migrants, or 
other forms of overwhelming differ-
ence. And they sometimes fight these 
Others to their last breath. At the same 
time, in modernity more bastards of 
the known and the unknown were cre-
ated than in any historical period be-
                                                             
13 For me, the most vivid description of 
what fear of fluidity can do is Klaus 
Theweleit’s classic psychoanalytic study of 
male fascist torturers’ fantasies (Theweleit 
1987). 
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fore. The restless urge of the moderns 
to meet the unfathomable Other, to 
reach the boundary of the kn/Own and 
to cross it, is what makes them tick. 
Bruno Latour offers a way to deal 
peacefully with the Other by including 
and excluding it according to an open, 
political, and thus ‘due’ process. Law’s, 
Mol’s, de Laet’s, Singleton’s and others’ 
political option is different. They want 
us to find new methods of living to-
gether peacefully with the Other with-
out ‘including’ it at the price of exclud-
ing others.  
Both versions of ‘ANT’s’ politics share 
the same goal, to help us to live to-
gether without referring to essences 
and dualisms. They differ in the place 
they situate themselves, which gives 
them a different vision14. From the very 
beginning and extending to today15, 
Latour places the social scientist at the 
warm and light sites where all is re-
versible and where therefore ‘rapidly 
revised’ suggestions of how we can live 
together can be proposed and dis-
cussed. Other theoreticians have 
moved from there to the margins, 
where they found suffering, but also 
new insights into ontological conse-
quences of non-essentialist thinking. 
So, what can ‘ANT’ do for us? It can 
help to dissolve dualisms of all kinds, 
but it also has accepted the challenge 
to help us to live in the resulting world 
of fluidity. Whether it succeeds is sub-
ject to the efforts of all those who are 
willing to collaborate.  
And on a very final note: What has us-
ing ‘ANT’ methods and concepts in this 
                                                             
14 Situated and therefore ‘partial vision’ as 
opposed to ‘the view from nowhere’ is dis-
cussed by Donna Haraway (1991a). 
15 In his ‘Introduction to Actor-Network-
Theory’, traditional sociology (i.e. all non-
‘ANT’) is given the task to work “with what 
has been already assembled” (Latour 2005:  
12), while ‘ANT’ takes care of the rest. 
text done for me (and hopefully also 
for the reader) in order to get to grips 
with ‘ANT’? I think I have succeeded 
not to privilege either the applications 
of ‘ANT’ or ‘ANT in the making’. The 
traditional way would be to use the ap-
plications against the theory or criticis-
ing the application for the (wrong) use 
of theory. The uses of ‘ANT’ which I 
found in the applications were anti-
dualistic, while the uses of ‘ANT in the 
making’ were about living together in a 
world in which all kinds of essentialist 
dualisms are already gone. I guess both 
belongs together. 
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